Sherman Carter v. Beaver County Service Area No. One : Brief of the Attorney General By Special Appearance by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)
1964
Sherman Carter v. Beaver County Service Area No.
One : Brief of the Attorney General By Special
Appearance
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
A. Pratt Kesler; Richard L. Dewsnup; Attorneys for the Office of the Attorney General; J. Harold
Call; Henriksen & Murdock; John O Christiansen; Attorneys for Respondents;
This Brief of Amicus Curiae is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah
Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Amicus Curiae, Carter v. Beaver County Service Area No. One, No. 10136 (Utah Supreme Court, 1964).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/4589
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the LAW LIB~Y 
STATE OF UTAH .- 0 
SHERMAN CARTER, aT~-\ L f:. · .· 
payer, for himself and all others · 2 ,.4 l95A similarly situated, ~' j\_ 
Plaintiff and Appellant, _____ ~ .-t:-ut~h--
-- ---- ·c\o;~. s~ Case' No. vs. 
BEAVER COUNTY SERVICE 
AREA NO. ONE, a body cor-
porate and politic, et al, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
10136 
BRIEF OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 
By Special Appearance 
Appeal from the Judgment of the Fifth 
District Court for Beaver County 
Hon. C. Nelson Day, Judge 
A. PRATT KESLER, 
Attorney General 
RICHARD L. DEWSNUP, 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for the Office of the 
Attorney General 
J. HAROLD CALL 
Bank Building lV,NI 
Heber City, Utah -. ViftSJTY OF UTAu 
Attorney for Aptellant , - 11=l 
HENRIKSEN MURDOpK APR 2 g 1965 C. R. Henriksen ' 
S. Reed Murdock · 
65 East 4th South ~ LAW LJfMA~ 
Salt Lake City, Utah lf'\QJ 
and 
JOHN 0. CHRISTIANSEN 
Beaver, Utah 
Attorneys for Respondents 
• 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
NATURE OF THE CASE------·······----------------------------------- 1 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT ---------------------------- 1 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL -------------------------------- 1 
STATEMENT OF FACTS -------------------------------------------- 2 
AUTHORITY FOR APPEARANCE ---------------------------- 2 
ARGUMENT: COUNTY SERVICE AREAS ARE 
QUASI-MUNICIPAL PUBLIC CORPORATIONS, 
PERFORMING GOVERNMENTAL FUN C-
TIONS FOR THOSE SITUATED WITHIN THE 
.A.REA. -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2 
A. Service Areas do not violate constitutional 
debt limitations. ------------------------------------------------ 2 
B. Servke Areas are not special commissions. ____ 19 
C. Service Areas perform essential ·governmental 
services. ---------------------------------------------------------------- 23 
CON CD USI 0 N -------------------------------------------------------------------- 31 
AUTHOR'ITIES CITE·D 
Utah Constitution: 
Article VI, Section 29 ---------------------------------------------- 19 
Article XI, Section 5 ------------------------------------------------8, 9 
Article XIV --------------------------------2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 13, 14, 19 
Utah Code Annotated 1953: 
17-6 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------10, 27 
17-7 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 10 
17-29 --------------------------------------------------------------------11, 17' 18 
17-29-3 ----------------------------------------------------------------------17' 20 
17-29-4 ( 1) -------------------------------------------------------------------- 22 
17-29..:5 ------------------------------------------------------------------------11, 12 
17-29-10.2 -------------------------------------------------------------------- 22 
17-29-10.2 ( 7) -------------------------------------------------------------- 23 
17-29-15 ------------------------------------------------------------------------ 23 
17-29-21 ------------------------------------------------------------------------ 12 
17-29-26 --------------------------------------------------.--------------------- 3'1 
78-33-11 ----------------------------------------------------------------------2, 31 
La\vs of Utah 1963: 
Chapter 198, Section 13 (Appropriations Act) ____ 30 
H. J. R. No. 21 ------------------------------------------------------------ 29 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTEN~TS-Continued 
Cases: 
Page 
Backman v. Salt Lake County, 13 Utah 2d 412, 375 
p ;2d 7 56 ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 20 
Bair v. Layton City Corporation, 6 Utah 2d 138, 307 
p .2d 895 ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 10 
Brown v. Salt Lake City, 33 Utah 222, 913 Pac. 570________ 24 
Burton v. Salt Lake City, 69 Utah 186, '253 Pac. 443 ____ 24 
Cdbia v. Roy City, 12 Utah 2d '375, 366 P.2d 986 ______ 27, 28 
Conder v. University of Utah, 123 Utah 18'2, 257 P.2d 
3'67 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 10 
Davis v. Provo City Corp., 1 Utah 2d 244, 265 P.2d 415 26 
Fjeldsted v. Ogden City, 83 Utah 278, 28 P.2d 1'144 ____ 6 
Freeman v. Stewart, 2 Utah 2d 319, '273 P.2d 17 4 ________ 11 
Gordon v. Provo City Corporation, Case No. 9992 
(decided Apri'l 27, 1964) --------------------------------'24, 27, 28 
Lehi City v. Meiling, 87 Utah 2'37, 4'8 P.2d '530 ____ 9, 12, 14,21 
Lund v. Salt Lake County, 58 Utah 546, 200 Pac. '510____ 24 
Patterick v. Carbon Water Conservancy District, 106 
Utah 55, 145 P.2d 503 -------------------------------------------- 9 
Pearson v. Salt Lake County, 9 Utah 2d 388, 346 P.2d 
155 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 10 
Scott v. 'Salt Lake County, 58 Utah 25, 196 Pac. 1022____ 6 
Spence v. U. S. A. C., 119 Utah 104, 225 P.'2d 18 ________ 5 
Tygesen v. lVIagna Water Corp., 119 Utah 274, 2'26 
p .2d 127 ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 10 
University of Utah v. Candland, 36 Utah 406, 104 Pac. 
285 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 5 
Utah Power & Light v. Provo City, 94 Utah 203, 7 4 
P.2d 1191 -------------------------------------------------------------------- 6 
Wadsworth v. Santaquin City, 83 Utah 32'1, 28 P.'2d 
161 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 9 
Miscellaneous : 
Proceedings, Constitutional Convention, Vol. I ___ ______ 15 
Proceedings, Constitutional Convention, Vol. II. ____ 15, 16 
Biennial Report of the Attorney General, June 30, 
19154 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 29 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN TI-IE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
S H E R MAN CARTER, a Tax-
payer, for himself and all others 
similarly situated, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
BEAVER COUNTY SERVICE 
AREA NO. ONE, a body cor-
porate and politic, et al, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Case No. 
10136 
BRIEF OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action for a declaratory judgment 
wherein a taxpayer has challenged the constitution-
ality of the Service Area Act (Chapter 29, Title 17, 
Utah Code Annotated). 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The lower court rejected plaintiff's arguments, 
and sustained the act as constitutional. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The Attorney General requests affirmance of 
the judgment of the lower court, but urges that Ser-
'ice Areas be judicially limited to the performance 
of essential governmental functions. 
1 
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STA'TE:MEN'T OF FACTS 
The Attorney General accepts the statement of 
facts as set forth in the briefs of appellant and 
respondents. 
AUTHORITY FOR APPEARANCE 
The Attorney General did not appear in the 
lower court, but has appeared on appeal by virtue of 
the statutory authority granted in Section 78-33-11, 
Utah Code Annotated (1953). The Attorney General 
argues neither in support of appellant nor respond-
ent, but in support of the public, and public agencies, 
of the State of Utah. 
ARGUMENT 
COUNTY SERVICE AREAS ARE QUASI-
MUNICIPAL PUBLIC CORPORATIONS, PER-
F 0 R M I N G GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTIONS 
FOR THOSE SITUATED WITHIN THE AREA. 
A. Service Areas do not violate constitutional 
debt limitations. 
Because of the serious significance of the ques-
tions related to debt limitations, it is deemed ad-
visable to set forth all of Article XIV of the Consti-
tution of Utah, consisting of Sections 1 through 7. 
ARTICLE XIV - Public Debt 
Section 1. To meet casual deficits or 
failures in revenue, and for necessary ex-
penditures for public purposes, including the 
erection of public buildings, and for the pay-
ment of all Territorial indebtedness assumed 
by the State, the 'State may contract debts, not 
exceeding in the aggregate at any one time, 
2 
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an an1ount equal to one and one-half per cen-
tum of the value of the taxable property of 
the State, as shown by the last assessment 
for State purposes, previous to the incurring 
of such indebtedness. But the State shall 
never contract any indebtedness except as 
in the next Section provided, in excess of 
such amount, and all monies arising from 
loans herein authorized, shall be applied 
solely to the purposes for which they were 
obtained. (As amended November 8, 1910.) 
Section 2. The State m.ay contract debts 
to repel invasion, suppress insurrection, or to 
defend the State in war, but the money ari-
sing from the contracting of such debts shall 
be applied solely to the purpose for whi'ch it 
was obtained. 
Section 3. No debt in excess of the tax-
es for the current year shall be created by any 
county or subdivision thereof, or by any school 
district therein, or by any city, town or vil-
lage, or any subdivision thereof in this State; 
unless the proposition to create such debt, 
shall have been submitted to a vote of such 
qualified electors as shall have paid a prop-
erty tax therein, in the year preceding such 
election, and a majority of those voting 
thereon shall have voted in favor of incur-
ring such debt. 
Section 4. When authorized to create 
indebtedness as provided in Section 3 of this 
Article, no county shall become indebted to 
an amount, including existing indebtedness 
exceeding two per centum. No city, town, 
school district or other municipal corpora-
tion, shall become indebted to an amount, in-
3 
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eluding existing indebtedness1 exceeding four 
per centum of the value of the taxable prop-
erty therein, the value to be ascertained by 
the last assessment for State and County pur-
poses, previous to the incurring of such in-
debtedness; except that in incorporated cities 
the assessment shall be taken from the last 
assessment for city purposes; provided, that 
no part of the indebtedness .allowed in this 
section shall be incurred for other than strict-
ly county, city, town or school district pur· 
poses; provided further, that any city of the 
first :and second c1lass when authorized as pro~ 
vided in Section three of this article, m:ay be al-
lowed to irrcur a larger indebtedne'ss, not t0 
exceed four per centum and any city of the 
third class, or town, not to exceed eight per 
centum additional, for supplying such city or 
town with water, artificial lights or sewers, 
when the works for supplying such water, 
light and sewers, shall be owned and controlled 
by the municipality. (As amended November 
8, 1910.) 
Section 5. All monies borrowed by, or 
on behalf of the State or any legal subdivi-
sion thereof, shall be used solely for the pur-
pose specified in the law authorizing the loan. 
Section 6. The State shall not assume 
the debt, or any part thereof, of any county, 
city, town or school district. 
Section 7. Nothing in this article shall 
be so construed as to impair or add to the 
obligation of any debt heretofore contracted, 
in accordance with the laws of Utah Terri-
tory, by any county, city, town or school dis-
trict, or to prevent the contracting of any 
4 
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debt, or the issuing of bonds therefor, in ac-
cordance with said laws, upon any proposition 
for that purpose, which, according to said 
laws, may have been submitted to a vote of 
the qualified electors of any county, city, town 
or school district before the day on which this 
Constitution takes effect. 
It is obvious that the framers of the Constitu-
tion were concerned with the debt limitations of the 
State and subordinate levels of governn1ent. Section 
1 of Article XIV initially placed a debt limit upon 
the State of $200,000 over and above the territorial 
indebtedness which was assumed by the State. In 
1910 the section was amended to increase the limit 
to permit the State to contract debts not exceeding 
in the aggregate at any one time an amount equal 
to one and one-half per centum of the value of the 
taxable property of the State. This appears to be 
an all inclusive limitation which would be a limit 
against any and all contracted indebtedness of the 
State of Utah, at least so far as such indebtedness 
is to be paid from tax revenues. This Court has held 
that revenue bonds or other indebtedness to be paid 
through a self-liquidating program or operation and 
not out of tax monies are not within the limitation 
(Uni?:ersity of Utah v. Candland, 36 Utah 406, 104 
P. 285, 24 L.R.A.; Spence v. Utah State Agricutural 
College, 119 Utah 104, 225 P.2d 18). Section 2 of 
Article XIV apparently makes a further exception if 
the purpose of the contracted indebtedness of the 
State is to repel invasion, suppress insurrection, or 
to defend the State in war. 
5 
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Having placed a limit on the indebtedness which 
could be contracted by the State, the framers of the 
Constitution then proceeded in Section 3 to place a 
limit upon subordinate levels of local government. 
The language used was very broad and would ap-
pear to include every level of local government which 
at that time was conceivable. The limit applied to 
"any county or subdivision thereof, or ... any school 
district therein, or . . . any city, town or village, or 
any subdivision thereof in this State; . . . " This 
general limitation was to prevent any debt in excess 
of the taxes for the current year of such particular 
political subdivision, unless a greater debt had been 
properly approved by a vote of the taxpayers owning 
property within the political subdivision. But this 
Court has held that the purchase or construction of 
public property, when payment therefore is to be 
made exclusively from revenues derived from such 
property, is exempt from the constitutional limita-
tion by virtue of the special fund doctrine (Utah 
Power and Light Company v. Provo City, 94 Utah 
203, 74 P. 2d 1191). This Court has further held 
that the word "taxes" in the above provision includes 
all revenues theoretically collectible even though not 
in fact collected (Scott v. Salt Lake County, 58 Utah 
25, 196 P. 1022). It has further been held that the 
word "taxes" includes all revenues other than taxes, 
such as license fees, waterworks income and depart-
ment fees (Fjelihted v. Ogden City, 83 Utah 278, 
28 P. 2d 1144). 
6 
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Section 4 of Article XIV serves as a limitation 
upon the authority granted in Section 3, at least to 
the extent that it places a ceiling upon the extra 
indebtedness which may be created through a vote 
by the qualified voters who have paid property taxes. 
Section 4 thus places a limit upon counties so that 
through an election whereby property taxpayers ap-
prove additional indebtedness, such additional in-
debtedness cannot exceed two per centum; cities, 
towns, school districts and other municipal corpora-
tions are limited to four per centum; and cities of 
the first and second class may incur a larger indebt-
edness through the procedure outlined in Section 3 
with a limit of an additional four per centum, and 
cities of the third class and towns may incur by the 
same procedure an additional indebtedness not to 
exceed eight per centum, providing that such addi-
tional indebtedness is for the purpose of supplying 
such city or town with water, artificial lights or 
sewers, and when the works for such supply are 
municipally owned and controlled. 
In summary, then, counties have a present con-
stitutional limit on their indebtedness of taxes for 
the current year plus two per centum of the present 
fair market value of the taxable property within the 
county; school districts and municipal corporations 
(other than cities and towns) have a present con-
stitutional limit on indebtedness of taxes for the 
current year plus four per centum of the current 
fair market value of the taxable property within 
7 
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such district or municipal corporation; cities of the 
first and second class have a present constitutional 
limitation upon indebtedness of taxes for the cur-
rent year plus eight per centum of the present fair 
market value of the taxable property within their 
boundaries; and cities of the third class and towns 
have a constitutional debt limit of taxes for the 
current year plus twelve per centum of the fair 
market value of the taxable property within their 
boundaries. This, of course, is the maximum indebt-
edness which can be incurred, assuming that the 
proper elections and other procedures .are followed 
and assuming that the funds created by the indebt-
edness are used for the proper purpose. As pointed 
out earlier, this Court has held that the limitations 
and procedures of Sections 3 and 4 do not apply 
when the indebtedness is to be liquidated by funds 
or revenue to be derived from the facility which was 
constructed or acquired by creating such indebted-
ness. (It will be noted that Section 4 was amended 
in 1910 to add the eight per centum limitation for 
cities of the third class and towns.) 
In 1932, Article XI, Section 5 of the Constitu-
tion of Utah was amended, adding certain provisions 
with reference to the powers of cities. Subsection 
(d) provides that the power therein conferred upon 
. cities included the power: 
(d) To issue and sell bonds on the secur-
ity of any such excess property, or of any 
public utility owned by the city, or of the 
revenues thereof, or both, including, in the 
8 
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case of public utility, a franchise stating the 
terms upon which, in case of foreclosure, the 
purchaser may operate such utility. 
In Wadsworth v. Santaquin City, 83 Utah 321, 
28 P.2d 161 (1933), this Court held that Article 
XI, Section 5 extended the constitutional debt limi-
tation to permit the is·suance and sale of bonds on 
the security of any public utility owned by the city 
or on the revenues to be derived from such utility: 
The amendment is of equal dignity with 
the provisions in article 14, sections 3 and 4. 
These provisions must be read and construed 
with relation to each other so as to give a 
meaning to each. The powers enumerated in 
the amendment [Article XI, Section 5 (d) ] 
must be given full significance and force as 
intending to grant, subject to acceptance or 
limitation by charter, or delegation by legisla-
tive act, the power to borrow money on the 
security of a utility or its income. It is an 
addition to the other provision relative to the 
limitation of municipal indebtedness. 
This Court has also held that the constitutional 
debt limitations above discussed did not apply to 
Metropolitan Water Districts, since such entities are 
special political subdivisions not covered by the con-
stitutional language (Lehi City v. Meiling, 87 Utah 
237, 48 P.2d 530). This Court further held that 
the constitutional debt limitations did not apply to 
water conservancy districts, since they, too, were a 
special type of political subdivision not within the 
constitutional definition (Patterick v. Carbon Water 
Conservancy District, 106 Utah 55, 145 P.2d 503). 
9 
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In Condor v. University of Utah, 123 Utah 182, 257 
P.2d 367, this Court refused to extend the rationale 
of the "restricted special fund theory" to State insti-
tutions, thereby concluding that the pledge of funds 
to be derived from the operation of dormitories to 
repay monies borrowed to construct such dormitories 
resulted in the creation of a debt which was not 
within the constitutional limitation. 
It has also been held that special improvement 
districts created under Title 17, Chapter 7 (permit-
ting the levying of special taxes to pay for improve-
ments constructed), do not create a debt within the 
constitutional debt limitation for counties or muni-
cipalities (Pearson v. Salt Lake County, 9 Utah 2d 
388, 346 P .2d 155) . It has further been held that 
a 50 year contract obligating a city to make pay-
ments over that period of time is not an indebtedness 
within the constitutional limitation where the month-
ly or annual payments vary with the amount of 
service received pursuant to the contract, and where 
the money to make the payments is to be derived 
from operating proceeds (Bair v. Layton City Cor-
poration, 6 Utah 2d 1318, '307 P.2d 8915. 
In Tygesen v. Magna Water Corporation, 119 
Utah 27 4, 226 P .2d 127, this Court further held 
that improvement districts created under Title 17, 
Chapter 6, were special arms of the State of Utah 
which were not included within the constitutional 
debt limitations for counties or municipal corpora-
tions, and that legislation authorizing indebtedness 
10 
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in excess of such constitutional limitations was 
therefore valid. See, also, Freeman v. Stewart, 2 
Utah 2d 319, 273 P.2d 17 4. 
In the instant case the Court now is called upon 
to determine whether the debt limitations of the 
Constitution are applicable to Service Areas created 
under Title 17, Chapter 29, Utah Code Annotated. 
It is perhaps advisable to take a brief survey of 
what is happening and can happen to the debt limi-
tations placed upon governmental units by the fram-
ers of the Constitution and the citizens and tax 
payers who adopted it. 
The Attorney General cannot quite support the 
argument by Appellant (Brief, Page 6) that: 
The majority could then declare that the 
county or parts thereof constituted any num-
ber of districts and thereby create enough 
taxing units that the result could be any 
amount of indebtedness even up to 100 per 
cent. If these constitutional sections are given 
effect, the total of authorized indebtedness 
of the county and any district therein should 
not exceed 2 per cent of [sic (and) ] that of 
a town or city of the third class should not 
exceed 4 per cent. 
The proper debt limitations of counties and 
cities are discussed above. Service Areas could not 
be formed to authorize an aggregate indebtedness 
up to 100 per cent. Section 17-29-5 (as amended) , 
provides in part that: 
County service areas may overlap if the 
service area which overlaps is entirely within 
1:1 
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the boundaries of the service area which it 
overlaps, provided not more than two (three, 
if one is county wide) service areas occupy 
the same area in the same county and no 
overlapping areas may perform the same 
service. 
It will thus be observed that the 12 per cent 
debt limitation authorized by Section 17-29-21 could 
be applied no more than three times, and no more 
than twice unless one Service Area encompassed the 
entire county. There could thus be a maximum debt 
limit under the Service Area Act of 36 per cent of 
the reasonable fair cash value of taxable property 
so situated as to be included within three separate 
Service Areas. While this is not so disturbing as the 
100 per cent possible indebtedness claimed by appel-
lant, it is sufficiently substantial as to justify a 
careful study. When one considers the possible in-
debtedness which might be placed against particular 
property by its inclusion within school districts, con-
servancy districts, improvement districts, cemetery 
districts, mosquito abatement districts, Service 
Areas, and any number of other special political 
subdivisions, in addition to the authorized indebted-
ness which may be incurred by the State, county or 
city, it is at once obvious that the aggregate indebt-
edness might approximate 100 per cent of the f.air 
cash value of such property. 
This concern was expressed in the dissenting 
opinion of Justice Moffat, concurred in by Justice 
Ephraim Hanson, in Lehi City v. Meiling, cited 
1'2 
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snpra, wherein he said at page 289 of the Utah 
RPporter: 
If constitutional limitations may thus by 
a process of definition be eliminated, evaded, 
or evaporated out of the Constitution, the 
stablizing purposes and restraints of consti-
tutions intended to tide the people over periods 
of emergency, excitement, or trouble until 
calm reflection may analyze and measure the 
needs, will cease to accomplish the purposes 
for which they are intended. Constitutions 
are drawn during sober hours, upon careful 
and painstaking consideration. It is beside 
the question to say the framers of the Con-
stitution did not anticipate an offer of large 
governmental allowances or bounties for such 
beneficial purposes. It is certain, however, 
that the framers of the Constitution and the 
people who ado'J!ted it intended that certain 
fixed debt polictes and limitations should be 
maintained. 
lt is not contended that the variety of special 
political subdivisions whose creation has been au-
thorized by legislation are products of "emergency, 
excitement or trouble" as feared by the dissent. 
But it is contended that any fair reading of Article 
XIV would place debt limitations on every level of 
government, whether quasi-municipal or not. The 
only authority of the Legislature to authorize or 
create indebtedness beyond the specific limitations 
of that Article is when the purpose for such debts 
is to repel invasion, suppress insurrection or defend 
the State in war. It is admitted that it is now too 
late in the day to cast clouds upon the various dis-
1'3 
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tricts which have been authorized by legislation, 
judicially approved, created locally, taxed locally, 
and which have bonded and created indebtedness 
beyond apparent constitutional debt limitations. 
This Court has consistently said that such entities 
are quasi-municipal corporations, distinguishable 
from cities or counties or any subdivision thereof, 
and thus not within the debt limitations of the Con-
stitution. But it is submitted that the current trend 
of judicially validating such entities ought not be 
continued ad infinitum without a review by the 
people of the meaning and intent of their constitu-
tional, de.bt limitations. Perhaps all of the quasi-
municipal agencies so created are beneficial, worth-
while and desired by the people receiving benefits 
therefrom. If so, the people should amend Article 
XIV of their Constitution either to increase the debt 
limitations, or to provide that any specially created 
quasi-municipal corporation is exempt from any debt 
limitation whatsoever. 
Any reasonable reading of the proceedings of 
the Constitutional Convention clearly demonstrates 
the accuracy of the dissenting opinion in Lehi City 
v.Meiling, cited supra, where it was observed that 
it was "certain" that the debt limitations were in-
tended to apply to Metropolitan Water Districts. 
There was considerable discussion of the debt limi-
tation provisions, and substantial difference of 
opinion as to what the provisions should be, but 
certainly no question but that the limitations would 
14 
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apply to all types of state and local government, so 
that the aggregate indebtedness could in no circum-
stance exceed the constitutional authorizations and 
limitations. 
In the proceedings of the Constitutional Con-
vention, Volume I, Page 777, the members of the 
Convention seemed to believe that they were as 
bright a group as would ever be assembled: 
Mr. Buys ... We have a better repre-
sentation here of this State, of the future 
State, than we will ever have in the Legisla-
ture. There are more men here and know 
just as well what we want as the Legislature 
will know, and if this is not what we want let 
us make it what we want, but certainly have 
some guaranty in this Constitution guaran-
teeing the citizens of this State against arrest, 
and I think it is just what we want as it is, 
and I shall certainly vote for it. 
Mr. Thurman. I will ask you if you don't 
think it is altogether improbable that there 
will ever be as bright a lot assembled together 
again? 
Mr. Buys. Yes, sir; I do. 
Pages 781 through 782 of Volume I, proceed-
ings of the Constitutional Convention, make clear 
the feeling of the framers of the Utah Constitution 
to the effect that there should be strict debt limita-
tions applicable to all levels of local government. 
This is further illustrated on Pages 1137-41 
of Volume II. Then on Pages 1184 through 1201 
of Volume II, which is a report of the debate during 
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the 47th day on the question of public debt, there 
was considerable discussion as to the number of 
electors which should be required to authorize in-
debtedness. In other words, while the constitutional 
debt limitation cannot be exceeded by any means, 
it cannot even be reached unless the taxpayers au-
thorize contracting indebtedness through the means 
of an election called for that purpose. There was 
much discussion in favor of requiring a majority of 
qualified electors to vote in approval of such debt 
as opposed to requiring only a majority of the elec-
tors who actually voted. By a close vote, the framers 
of the Constitution rejected the proposition that a 
majority of qualified electors would have to approve 
the debt and simply provided that a majority of 
those voting would be sufficient. 
After this action, the convention then revised 
downward some of the earlier propositions as to 
what the debt limitations should be. In particular, 
Pages 1188 through 1196 of Volume II show the 
general feeling of members of the convention in their 
opposition to high debt limitations and their strict 
feeling that the public .and taxpayers should be pro-
tected against themselves by binding limitations. 
Otherwise, the framers were concerned that a cur-
rent feeling in favor of a new school or a hospital 
or a library or some other facility would cause each 
successive election to carry, and .a new indebtedness 
would be created for each new public facility until 
the taxpayers had voted themselves into a position 
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of hopeless debt. These limitations on public debt 
were intended to prevent the public from voting 
themselves into that type of situation. 
It is difficult to perceive any limit to the variety 
of services that could be provided by Service Areas 
created under Title 17, Chapter 29. Such services 
may include, but are not limited to, police protec-
tion, structural fire protection, culinary or irriga-
tion water retail service, water conservation, park 
and recreation and parkway facilities and services, 
cemeteries, public libraries, sewers, sewage and 
storm water treatment and disposal, flood control, 
garbage and refuse collection, street lighting, air-
ports, planning and zoning, streets and roads, curb 
and gutter and sidewalk construction and mainten-
ance, mosquito abatement, health department serv-
ices and hospital services. The above services are 
specifically authorized by Section 17 -2'9-3, which sec-
tion also provides that such services and facilities 
are hy no means exclusive, and that Service Areas 
may provide other services not limited to those enu-
merated. It is difficult to see where the ends and 
limits of Service Areas are. It raises a sobering ques-
tion in view of the strict constitutional debt limita-
tions-at what point, if ever, should a judicial rein be 
placed upon the Legislature? Or should there he an 
unlimited number of districts or areas to perform 
any conceivable service or function, with no debt limi-
tation, save that which may be provided from time 
to time by the Legislature? 
17 
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Should not this Court place a judicial limita-
tion upon at least the nature of those entities which 
may be created to operate free and clear of constitu-
tional debt limitations? In this regard, it is sug-
gested that only those entities which perform essen-
tial governmental purposes should be so recognized. 
Perhaps the Court should conclude that a Service 
Area created to perform a hospital service is a 
constitutional entity because such service is a vital 
governmental service, of critical importance to the 
welfare of the citizens within the area. It is ques-
tionable whether the same result should obtain if the 
Service Area were created for an elaborate recrea-
tional faciliity as authorized by the act. 
The position of the Attorney General is not to 
seek a reversal of the lower court, nor to urge the 
Court to declare the instant Service Area to be an 
unconstitutional entity. It is believed that this Court 
should sustain Chapter 29, Title 17 so far as it au-
thorizes Service Areas to perform hospital functions. 
But it is believed that the Court should use cautious 
language with respect to the other types of Service 
Areas that might conceivably be created within the 
broad language of the statute. There is always a 
danger in friendly lawsuits which seek a hurried 
judicial whitewashing of statutes so that entities 
created thereunder can procure immediate financing 
to proceed with some contemplated facility. The 
urge of the Attorney General upon this Court is 
simply that a comprehensive view be taken of the 
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nature and extent to which quasi-municipal corpora-
tions are being formed, and the almost unlimited 
debt that can accumulate against the property of a 
taxpayer who may or may not favor such debt. Per-
haps the time has come to afford some protection to 
such taxpayers, even against themselves, at least 
until such time as the people of the State of Ut~h 
have an opportunity to review the debt limitations 
of Article XIV of their Constitution and determine 
whether or not such limitations on governmental 
agencies shall be meaningful or meaningless. 
B. Service Areas are not special commissions. 
Article VI, Section 29 of the Utah Constitution 
provides that; 
The legislature shall not delegate to any 
special commission, private corporation or 
association, any power to make, supervise or 
interfere with any municipal improvement, 
money, property or effects, whether held in 
trust or otherwise, to levy taxes, to select a 
capitol site, or to perform any municipal func-
tions. 
It is believed that Service Areas do not violate 
the prohibition of the above section of the Constitu-
tion. The Service Area Act is not a delegation of 
anything to anyone, but is simply permissive legisla-
tion which allows certain things to be performed by 
local government. It is clear that the board of county 
commissioners of any particular county may initiate 
the formation of a Service Area, but the Service 
Area is locally formed, locally controlled, locally 
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operated and locally taxed. 
It is true that cities of the third class and towns 
may be included in a Service Area, but cities of the 
first and second class cannot. Therefore, the only 
possible conflict would be if a Service Area per-
formed municipal functions which otherwise should 
and could have been performed by cities of the third 
class or towns which were included within the Ser-
vice Area. But in this regard, it will be observed 
that such cities or towns are authorized to have rep-
resentation on the governing board of the Service 
Area, .and if any such city or town were performing 
the same municipal function which the Service Area 
sought to perform, then the city or town could be ex-
cluded from the Service Area because it would not be 
benefited by receiving a duplication of services 
already rendered by the m unici pali ty. 
Backman v. Salt Lake County, 13 Utah '2d 412, 
375 P.2d 756 (1962), which invalidated the Civic 
Auditorium and Sports Arena Act of 1961, is dis-
tinguishable from the present case. In the Backman 
case the Court found that the act created a special 
commission and empowered it to interfere with a 
municipal function, and, further, that the act was 
arb]trary in that it was designed to apply to Salt 
Lake County only. It is submitted that the Back-
man decision was sound, but simply is not applicable 
to a Service Area. It must be recognized that the 
services authorized by Section 17-29-3 are, in the 
main, legitimate areas justifying police power legis-
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lation (particularly when such legislation simply 
authorizes localities to create such entities and then 
establish their own governing boards). 
The explanation by Justice Wolfe in Lehi City 
v. Meiling, 87 Utah 237, 84 P.2d 530, though a 
special concurring opinion, succinctly discusses au-
thorization by the Legislature for the creation of 
units of local government to perform certain func-
tions which might conceivably have been performed 
by municipalities, had they been financia'lly able: 
That is not the same as saying that an 
entity could not be formed to do that which 
the city could not do because of the magnitude 
or character of the project or because it was 
such a project which must necessarily serve 
more than one city. Thus, if an agency were 
constituted to aid and not to interfere with the 
performance of a municipal function, the case 
might well be different. An illustration is at 
hand in the very case under consideration. 
Any one of the cities or towns, perhaps all of 
them, included in the water district sought to 
be formed, cannot perhaps undertake to carry 
through a project of the magnitude which the 
Legislature had in mind when this act was 
passed. It may even require the combined re-
sources of several of these water districts, and 
extraneous financial aid, to accomplish it. Yet 
the end to be accomplished, to wit, furnishing 
the inhabitants of each city or town with 
water, is in itself a municipal function. But 
the building of an immense project to serve 
many cities is in itself of a magnitude and 
character as to take it out of the category of 
municipal functioning. It is certainly not the 
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ordinary function of a m unici pali ty in this 
state to construct immense engineering pro-
jects for the bringing of water from long dis-
tances. A "municipal function" is that which 
municipalities ordinarily do, or are capable of 
doing, or which they may by the Legislature 
be permitted to do. Supplying water to its 
inhabitants and building appropriate water-
works to do this is a municipal function. En-
gaging in some vast engineering project far 
beyond its financial powers, and perhaps its 
legal powers, but ultimately designed to sup-
ply its inhabitants, together with inhabitants 
of other cities, with water may be something 
more than a municipal function. If the build-
ing of the Boulder Dam was necessary to give 
the city of Los Angeles a water supply, it 
might still be a national rather than a munici-
pal function, not only on account of the legal 
complications due to its interstate nature, but 
because of the magnitude of the project being 
such as to be beyond the capabilities of even a 
city of that size, or even of a state. 
A final note with reference to the Service Area-
county relationship compels the observation that Ser-
vice Areas are designed to be very closely connected 
with the county level of government. The board of 
county commissioners can make a determination 
that a Service Area is needed and proceed to estab-
lish the 'Same [Section 17 -'2'9-4 · (11) ] . The Legislature 
has declared that a Service Area shall be deemed "a 
body corporate and politic and a quasi-municipal 
public corporation .... " (Section 17-29-10.2). But 
the board of trustees of the Service Area can utilize 
"any existing county offices, officers or employees 
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for purposes of the service area when in the opinion 
of the board of trustees it is advisable to do so .... " 
[Section 17-29-10.2 (7) ]. Apparently the Board of 
County Commissioners has nothing to say about the 
use of its officers or facilities by the Service Area; 
but, on the other hand, the Board of County Com-
missioners has the exclusive say as to how much 
money it shall take from Service Area funds, and the 
Service Area has nothing to say about the amount so 
taken by the county (Section 17-29-15). About the 
only limitation is the implied concept that everyone 
¥.1.11 be reasonable about the whole thing. One cannot 
help but wonder, however, whether a county wide 
Service Area would not be, in effect, the alter ego 
of the county. This not only casts shadows as to the 
type of entity the Service Area is, but it further 
shows the thin veil used to escape the constitutional 
debt limitations applicable to counties (and as dis-
cussed under Point A, supra). 
C. Service Areas perform essential govern-
mental services. 
Much uncertainty exists with respect to whether 
governmental immunity is a defense to tort claims 
asserted against the variety of quasi-municipal cor-
porations organized pursuant to laws similar to the 
Service Area Act. This Court has applied a test as 
to whether a particular function of a government 
subdivision is proprietary or governmental, permit-
ting suit in former but denying it in the latter. 
As recently as April27, 1964 this Court handed 
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down its opinion in Gordon v. Provo City Corpora-
tion, Case No. 9992, in which the city was held 
liable for injury sustained by the plaintiff arising 
out of the operation of a municipal water system. 
Liability was based upon the observation that the 
water system was a commercial venture engaged in 
by the city in a proprietary capacity. In so holding, 
the Court followed earlier Utah Cases, such as 
Brown v. Salt Lake City, 33 Utah 222, 93 P. 570 and 
Burton v. Salt Lake City, 69 Utah 186, 253 P. 443. 
The distinction of proprietary versus govern-
mental is not ordinarily applied to the State of Utah 
or its agencies, such as the Department of Highways 
or the Department of Fish and Game. It is unclear 
to what extent the distinction would be applied to 
counties or to governmental public corporations such 
as metropolitan water districts, improvement dis-
tricts or Service Areas. The language in Lund v. 
Salt Lake County, 58 Utah 546, 200 P. 510, suggests 
that the distinction may be applied to counties. In 
that case Salt Lake County was engaged in an opera-
tion whereby it supplied water for rental to certain 
persons, .and the Court concluded that such a prac-
tice was ultra vires because the county was not 
authorized to engage in the water business. The 
Court therefore refused to apply the governmental 
v. proprietary test, saying that such a test would be 
moot since the act or practice was ultra vires : 
If they (Salt Lake County) were organ-
ized to engage in such business, as was Salt 
Lake City in the Brown case, cited by plain-
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tiff, we see no objection to applying the com-
mon-law doctrine of respondeat superior, and 
holding the municipality liable. On the other 
hand, if they are entirely without authoriza-
tion to engage in private business we do not 
understand upon what principle they could be 
held liable, whether the business was profit-
able or not ... 
Prior to disposing of the case by holding that 
the water business was an ultra vires act of the 
county, the Court indicated its approval of the theory 
that the doctrine of respondeat superior would apply 
to make the county liable for negligent acts of its 
employees when performing a proprietary service, 
and a great many authorities are cited on Page 560 
of the Utah Reporter to justify such a holding. But 
on Page 562 the Court seemed unsure as to whether 
the county in fact should be liable if the revenue 
derived from a proprietary function was incidental 
rather than substantial: 
Even if such condition existed (existence 
of the power by the county to engage in the 
water business), and the power so exercised, 
the revenue derived therefrom would be pure-
ly incidental. In such circumstances we know 
of no reason why plaintiff's right to recover 
damages should be different from what it is 
in the case as it now stands. (citing cases) 
So it is unclear as to what the dictum of the 
Lund case really says. It suggests that the govern-
mental versus proprietary distinction should apply 
to counties, but at the same time suggests that if the 
proprietary function is only incidentally profitable 
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rather than substantially profitable, even a pro-
prietary function will be protected by governmental 
immunity. This would mean that only those pro-
prietary functions yielding a substantial profit to 
the county would be truly proprietary in the sense 
that governmental immunity would not be a defense. 
Compare Davis vs. Provo City Corporation, 1 Utah 
2d 244, 265 P.2d 415. 
The Federal Government, as a government of 
delegated power only, has been recognized as being 
able to perform only governmental functions and 
without power or authority to exercise proprietary 
functions (although the United States has consented 
to suit in certain areas). This is so because all 
powers of the Federal Government are those express-
ly granted by the Federal Constitution or those 
powers necessarily implied from powers expressly 
granted. As such, the Federal Government can only 
act in a governmental capacity. Anything beyond 
that would be an ultra vires act. The State of Utah 
is a government having a residuum of governmental 
power, and in this regard is more comparable to a 
municipality ("home rule" city) than it is to the 
Federal Government. Despite this, the State of Utah 
and its agencies have been held to act in only a 
governmental capacity, while municipalities (and 
perhaps counties) are considered to act in proprie-
tary as well as governmental capacities. 
This raises the question as to whether quasi-
municipal corporations, such as Service Areas, act 
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only in governmental capacities or whether they 
also act in proprietary capacities. The possibility of 
anomalous results has .already been suggested by this 
Court. This can be illustrated by examining two 
cases. In Cobia v. Roy City, 12 Utah 2d 375, 366 
P.2d 986 this Court said that the operation of a 
sewer is a governmental function: 
It seems to us that the operation of a 
sewer more nearly is governmentally charged 
than are most or all of those situations we 
have reviewed, as reflected in the cases just 
mentioned. To exclude the operation of sewers 
from this field reasonably would seem un-
justifiable in logic or otherwise. To do so 
would do violence to our concept of separation 
of powers, we believe. We have left to the 
Constitution and legislature the matter of 
waiver of immunity in such cases. 
But in Gordon v. Provo City Corporation, cited 
supra, the Court unhesitatingly reaffirmed earlier 
cases concluding that the operation of a water sys-
tem was a proprietary function wherein govern-
mental immunity could not serve as a defense. Thus, 
the Cobia case and the Gordon case clearly set forth 
the rule tbat a 'sewer system is a governmental func-
tion but a water system is a proprietary function, at 
least so far as municipal operations are concerned. 
Consider the problems that such holdings pose. Title 
17, Chapter 6, Utah Code, provides for the creation 
of improvement districts for the operation of water 
or sewage systems. A district authorized under that 
chapter could be for either purpose, and the method 
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of creating and operating such a district would be 
the same without regard to whether the district was 
organized for the purpose of operating a water or a 
sewer system. In either instance revenues would be 
derived both from the sale of the service and from 
taxation, and in neither case could the district oper-
ate for a profit. Would this Court hold that an im-
provement district authorized for the purposes of 
operating a sewage system operates in a govern-
mental capacity, while another improvement district 
authorized in an identical manner under the very 
same chapter but for the purpose of operating a 
water system would be a proprietary creature, hav-
ing no governmental immunity at all. The Court 
would have to so hold if it followed the municipal 
corporation distinction applied in the Cobia and 
Gordon cases, but if the Court applied a different 
test because improvement districts are quasi-munici-
pal corporations, then both water and sewage dis-
triets might be treated the same. 
This problem assumes considerable importance. 
Should Service Areas procure liability insurance 
policies to protect against tort claims? They should 
if their functions are proprietary, but they should 
not if their functions are governmental. But if 
liability insurance is obtained and the function is 
governmental, then the payment of the premium for 
such insurance would be "a waste of taxpayers' 
money" as observed by the Court in the Cobia case, 
and would perhaps be an illegal,expenditure of pub-
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lie funds as ruled by the Attorney General in a 
number of opinions (Opinion Nos. 54-022, 54-035, 
54-004, 53-127 and 54-058, Biennial Report of the 
Attorney General, June 30, 1954). 
On the other hand, if the Service Area does not 
wish to waste taxpayers' money, nor to make an 
illegal expenditure of public funds, and so refrains 
from securing liability insurance on the assumption 
that its conduct is governmental, and then finds, 
when a substantial tort claims is asserted, that its 
function is in fact proprietary, it is too late to obtain 
insurance, and the service area may find itself in a 
position where it is unable to pay a substantial judg-
ment. 
It is significant to note that the Legislature has 
concerned itself, and is presently concerning itself, 
with a means of legislatively permitting some re-
covery against governmental units by tort claimants. 
A tort claims act was passed in 1961 but was vetoed 
by the Governor. In 1963 the Legislature in H.J.R. 
No. 21 resolved that the Legislative Council: 
... investigate and study the effects upon 
the state and its political subdivisions of 
immunity from suit and consent to be liable 
for the torts of their officers, employees and 
agents, together with the most workable 
statutes and procedures for carrying out such 
legislation and to make recommendations to 
the 36th Legislature. (Laws of Utah 1963, 
Page 685) 
In order to finance this study, the Legislature 
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appropriated to the Legislative Council the sum of 
$25,000 (Item 4, Section 13, Chapter 198, Laws of 
Utah 1963) . While it is not clear when or under 
what circumstances the Legislature will provide for 
tort claimants to realize a recovery against the State 
or its political subdivisions, it is clear that the 
Legislature is vitally concerned with the problem and 
is working diligently toward a practical solution. 
Since the Court has repeatedly observed that this 
problem is a legislative one to be solved by the Legis-
lature, this Court should give a broad application 
to governmental immunity until such time as a tort 
claims act is passed. It is likely that such legislation 
will include metropolitan water districts, improve-
ment districts, Service Areas and related entities, 
and those entities should therefore be considered to 
be governmental in nature and to have the defense 
of governmental immunity until such time as the 
Legislature enacts tort claims legislation. 
It is realized that no specific issue is presented 
on appeal relating to the question of governmental 
immunity. But this Court is called upon to speak 
for the first time concerning the nature of the en-
tities created as Service Areas under the Service 
Area Act, and this Court should have in mind the 
application of any language used in describing Ser-
vice Areas. It is submitted that if this Court holds 
that the only quasi-municipal corporations which can 
be created to operate free and clear of the constitu-
tional debt limitations are those which perform 
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essential governmental functions, then it is both 
reasonable and proper to assume that such quasi-
municipal corporations enjoy governmental im-
munity from tort suits. This would serve as a guide 
to such subdivisions of government in determining 
whether public liability policies should be secured. 
This would also 'be consistent with the Legislature's 
declaration in Section 17-29-26 to the effect that 
Service Areas perform "essential governmental 
functions." 
CONCLUSION 
The Attorney General has appeared in this ap-
peal pursuant to Section 78-33-11, not in support of 
the appellant or the respondent, but in support of 
the taxpayers in general throughout the State of 
Utah as well as in support of quasi-municipal cor-
porations of various designations which have been 
created and are operating under a variety of 
statutes. It is believed that the time is now ripe for 
this Court to carefully consider the nature and ex-
tent to which quasi-municipal corporations can be 
created to contract indebtedness free and clear of 
any const:iutional limitations. As the various stat-
utes authorizing the organization of quasi-munici-
pal corporations have been presented to the Court, 
the Court has followed a step-by-step pattern of vali-
dating these entities. If when the first such case had 
been presented to this Court, it would have been 
foreseeable that such a great number of similar en-
tities would later be authorized by the Legislature, 
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it is likely that the Court earlier would have sug-
gested some limitations. But at this point we are a 
long way down the road, and even with the benefit 
of hindsight to guide foresight, it is not possible to 
foresee how many new but similar entities will yet 
be authorized by the Legislature. In order not to 
disturb prior decisions of this Court, and yet to give 
some sober protection to taxpayers and the public in 
general, it is submitted that this Court should rule 
that the only quasi-municipal corporations which 
may be created are those that perform essential 
governmental purposes which cannot reasonably be 
performed by an existing level of government in the 
particular area. 
This language would suggest to the Legislature 
that there are limits to which quasi-municipal cor-
porations can be created, and it would further sug-
gest to such existing entities that they perform ser-
vices as a governmental function and are immune 
from tort liability until the Legislature enacts some 
specific legislation with reference to tort claims, 
thus, for the present, guiding such political subdi-
visions in their decision whether to insure or not to 
insure against tort liability claims. 
Respectfully submitted, 
A. PRATT KESLER 
Attorney General 
RICHARD L. DEWSNUP 
Assistant Attorney General 
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